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BROKEN PLATFORMS, BROKEN COMMUNITIES? FREE
SPEECH ON CAMPUS

Stephen M. Feldman'

ABSTRACT
Free speech disputes have broken out on numerous college and university
campuses. In several incidents, protesters have attempted to block the presentations
of well-known and controversial speakers who threaten the communal status of
societal outsiders. These events have sparked not only widespread media coverage
but also the publication of multiple scholarly books and articles. None of this scholarship, however, has recognized that the interrelated histories of free expression and
democracy can shed considerable light on these matters. This Article takes on that
challenge. Specifically, this Article explores the ramifications of the historical interrelationship between free expression and democracy for campus no-platforming
disputes. Starting in the late 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically invigorated
the protection of expression in reaction to a paradigm change in democracy, going
from a republican to pluralist democracy. Yet, one cannot conceptoalize pluralist
democracy without accounting for the political community: who belongs and participates? Nowadays, to protect the operation of pluralist democracy itself, at least one
issue must be taken off the table. All individuals must be treated as full and equal
citizens in good standing. Any expression that undermines the political standing of
a marginalized group should be subordinate to the needs of democracy and therefore
beyond First Amendment protection.

THE INTERRELATED HISTORIES OF FREE ExPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY ...
A. Republican Democracy: Limited Protection for Expression ........
B. Pluralist Democracy: Expansive First Amendment Protection ......
II. FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS ..................................
A. Free Speech Criticisms of the Protesters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Counterargument: From Democracy and Free Expression .....
III. HISTORY REDUX: THE POUTICS OF FREE SPEECH....................
A. Winners and Losers .......................................
B. Beyond Constitutional Principle .............................
CONCLUSION ...................................................
I.

953
953
959
964
966
968
974
975
982
987

• Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor ofLaw and Adjunct Professor
ofPolitical Science, University ofWyoming. I thaok Richard Delgado and Howard Gillman
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
949

950

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF R.!GHfS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:949

Free speech on college and university campuses has generated controversies for
decades.' In recent years, though, several such controversies have attracted widespread
and sustained media attention. In one instance, progressive students attempted to prevent conservative theorist Charles Murray, notorious for ostensibly linking intelligence
to race,' from speaking at Middlebury College.' In a similar incident, progressive
students at the University of California, Berkeley, interfered with a speech by former
Breitbart editor and right-wing provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos.4 In response to these
roiling disputes, publishers have rushed into print multiple new books focused on
campus free speech issues.'
The public has paid heed to these issues partly because of the polarizing politics
that animate the disputes. 6 On the one side, conservatives emphasize liberty: rightwing speakers have a First Amendment freedom to speak. 7 From this perspective,
progressive protesters contravene fundamental norms of free expression. On the
other side, progressives argue that campuses need to promote equality and inclusiveness. 8 Speakers such as Murray and Yiannopoulos purposefully denigrate racial and
sexual minorities and transform campuses into hostile environments? Unsurprisingly,
1

RIC!!ARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? WHY TilE FIRST
AMENDMENT SHOUlD NOT PROTECT HATE SPEECH AND WHITE SUPREMACY 23-29 (2018)
(emphasizingrecurringdisputes).ForadiscussionoftheFreeSpeechMovementof1964and
1965 at the UniversityofCalifumia, Berkeley, see Jo Freeman, The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN SOCIALMOVEMENTS 1178 (Innnaoue!Nessed., 2004).
2
For a discussion ofthat viewpoint, see RIC!!ARD J.IIERRNSTEIN & CHARLEs MURRAY,
THE BElL CURVE: INTEUJGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
3
Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Muidlebwy, THE A1LAN1IC (Mar. 6,
2017),https:/lwww.theatlaotic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebmy-free-speech-violence
/518667 [http://perma.cc/T6TA-S7AH]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by
'Bell Curve' Author at Vermont College, N.Y. liMEs (Mar. 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2lo8Ye9.
4
Aaron Hanlon, What Stunts Like Milo Yiannopoulos 's 'Free Speech Week' Cost, N.Y.
TiMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yn9LxK; Benjamin Oreskes & Javier Paozar, Milo
Yiannopoulos Co'lfronted by Dozens ofCounter-Protesters During BriefAppearance on UC
Berkeley Campus, L.A TiMEs (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanowlla-me

-ln-berkeley-milo-20 170924-story.html [http://perma.cc/HPV3-8KCV].
' For examples ofsuch publications, see SrGALR BEN-PORATH,FREESPEECHONCAMPUS
(2017); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2017);
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note I; JOHN PALFREY, SAFE SPACES, BRAVE SPACES:
DIVERSITY AND FREE EXPRESSION IN EDUCATION (20 17); KEirn E. WHITI1NGTON, SPEAK
FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH (20 18).
6
See Niraj Chokshi, What College Students Really Think About Free Speech, N.Y. TiMEs
(Mar. 12, 20 18), https://nyti.ms/2tzsed9 (summarizing an empirical study ofstudent attitudes
toward free speech).
7
See discussion infra Section II.A.
8
See discussion irifi"a Section II.B.
' For one discussion in the popular media, see Mark Peters, Coulter, Milo, and the Censorious History of 'No-Plaiforming,' BosTON GWBE (May 16, 2017), https://www.boston
globe.com/ideas/20 17/05/16/coulter-milo-and-censorious-history-platforming/V 5xoR6
sUabA9at5yd8WhrK/story.html [http://permacc/BQP5-2L73].
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many constitutional scholars have adopted positions consistent with their general
political orientations." Even so, the apparent tension between the constitutional values
of free speech and equality has prompted some liberal scholars to support the conservative speakers as a matter of First Amendment principle." Other scholars insist
that the tension between free speech and equality can be resolved without choosing
between the two. 12
Despite the proliferatioo of scholarship focused oo campus free speech issues,
nobody has recognized that the interrelated histories of free expression and democracy can shed considerable light on these matters." To be sure, some scholars have
sought guidance from either the history of free expression or the cootours of democracy, but they have not put the two together. 14 This Article takes on that challenge.
Specifically, this Article explores the ramifications of the historical interrelationship
between free expression and democracy for campus no-platforming disputes, where
student protesters try to prevent controversial right-wing speakers like Murray and
Yiannopoulos from using campus facilities.
One cannot understand free expression in America without accounting for a
twentieth-century transition from a republican to pluralist democracy. Roughly, republican democracy emphasized the virtuous pursuit of the common good, while
pluralist democracy emphasized (and emphasizes) processes allowing widespread
political participation." Judicial protection of free expression under republican
10

See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Essay, Defonding the First Amendmentfrom Antidiscrimination Laws, 82 N.C. L. REv. 223 (2003) (arguing for the conservative side); Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic, Four Ironies ofCampus Climate, I 01 MINN. L. REv. 1919 (2017) (arguing for
the progressive side). The politics offree expression has shifted over time. See, e.g., LAWRENCE

BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN TilE SUPREME COURT 44-45 (20 17).
11
CilEMERINsKY &GillMAN, supra note 5 (the liberal Cbernerinsky arguing for protecting
free expression).
12
BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 2-5 (arguing that freedom and inclusion can be hannonized in inclusive freedom); PALFREY, supra note 5, at2-3 (arguing for hannonizationoffree
expression and equality); Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, I 01 MINN. L.
REv. 1863 (2017) (aiming for a middle ground).
13
For a comprehensive history of the interrelationship between democracy and free expression, see STEPHEN M. FElDMAN, FREE ExPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (2008).
14
See, e.g., CilEMERINsKY &GillMAN, supra note 5, at 10-12,47 (arguingthatthehistory
of free expression is important to analyzing current campus free speech disputes); Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1924-32 (discussing the history of free expression).
15
For books discussing aspects ofthe transformation ofdemocracy, see LlzABElH CoHEN,
MAKING ANEW DEAl: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CIDCAGO, 1919-1939 (1990); FELDMAN,
supra note 13; HOWARDGill.MAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: TIIERISEANDDEMISEOF
LoCHNERERAPOUCEPOWERSJURISPRUDENCE(1993);M!CHAELJ.SANDEL,DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF APuBUC PHILoSOPHY (1996). Bruce Ackerman also
emphasizes regime change in constitutional law. His discussions ofthe key decade ofthe 1930s
are spread over two volumes. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TilE PEoPlE: THE Crv!LRIGHTS REvoLUTION (20 14); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TilE PEOPlE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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democracy was limited, 16 but free expression became a constitutional lodestar under
pluralist democracy." Wbile theorists ofpluralist democracy often emphasize its crucial
processes, such as voting, 18 pluralist democracy necessarily includes substantive components as well. 19 Most important, one cannot conceptualize pluralist democracy
without accounting for the political community: who belongs and participates? My
argument is tbat, today, to protect the operation of pluralist democracy itself, we
must take at least one issue off the table, so to speak. Namely, all individuals, regardless of subculture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens
in good standing. This issue can no longer be open to democratic debate. Consequently, any expression that undermines the political standing of a marginalized group
should be subordinate to the needs of democracy and therefore beyond First Amendment protection.
With regard to the no-platforming disputes, this analysis suggests tbat universities
and colleges should restrict the granting of platforms to speakers who are likely to
threaten the full and equal standing of marginalized groups on campuses. If a platform is denied in the frrst place, then students will not need to protest against such
speakers. The university or college should not pretend to maintain neutrality. It
instead needs to nurture and protect the substantive norms of a democratic culture.
Part I of this Article traces the interrelated histories of free expression and
democracy.20 It emphasizes the twentietb-centurytransformation ofdemocracy and the
First Amendment implications of tbat transformation.21 Part II focuses on noplatforming disputes, zeroing in on a recent controversy at Lewis and Clark Law
School.22 This Part first explains the arguments in favor of upholding the free speech
rights of the speakers. 23 It then articulates a counterargument based on the interrelation of free expression and democracy. 24 Part ill returns to history, briefly sketching
the operation of politics in free speech disputes throughout American history. 25 Free
expression, the history shows, bas not been a neutral principle. In free speech controversies (as in otber disputes), marginalized outsiders typically lose while the wealthy
and mainstream usually win. This history helps explain why abstract or formal freeexpression principles and doctrines cannot alone resolve the no-platforming disputes. Part N is a conclusion.'6
16

See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3.

17
18

Id.

19

20

21
22

23
24
25

26

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
infra notes 203-tl8 and accompanying text.
discussion irifi"a Part I.
discussion infra Sections I.A, B.
discussion infra Part II.
discussion irifi"a Section II.A.
discussion infra Section II.B.
discussion infra Part ill.
discussion irifi"a Part IV.
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A caveat is appropriate at the outset. This Article does not argue that the United
States has always been committed to a principle of full and equal citizenship. The
nation, moreover, has not made steady progress toward achieving such equality. To
the contrary, a conflicting combination ofprinciples and traditions has always swirled
through America. In his magisterial study of citizenship laws, Rogers M. Smith
described a shifting mix of"liberal, democratic republican, and inegalitarian ascriptive elements.'m In the history of free expression, competing traditions of dissent
and suppression persistently animated American political disputes.28 Furthermore,
the tensions arising from conflicting principles and traditions remain as prominent
today as ever. Thus, in a sense, the argument here is aspirational. A commitment to
full and equal citizenship will not vanqnish the inegalitarian ascriptive attitudes that
still pulse through American society. In the no-platforming disputes, the issues
revolve around the treatment of students and potential or invited speakers. Even if
a university or college were to banish speakers likely to spout hateful words, hateful
attitudes will not disappear. But banning speakers who target marginalized groups
will help engender democratic communities of full and equal citizens.
I. 1iiE INTERRELATED HiSTORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY

A. Republican Democracy: Limited Protection for Expression
From the framing to the early twentieth century, Americans understood their
government to be a republican democracy. 29 Citizens and government officials were
supposed to be imbued with civic virtue. 30 Being virtuous, they were to pursue the
common good rather than partial or private interests; the political pursuit of selfinterest contravened republican democratic government." To be sure, popular
conceptions of virtue and the common good changed over time. 32 For instance, the
framers considered political parties to be factions bent on government corruption. 33
Parties, therefore, were believed to inherently contravene the common good, but by
27

ROOERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CmzENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 6 (1997).
28
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3-5.
29
See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 14-290; STEPHEN M. FElDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS
COURT, DONAlD TRUMP, AND OUR FAlliNG CONS1ITUTION 19-104 (2017) [hereinafter
FEIDMAN,FAillNGCONSTITUIION]; SANDEL,szpranote 15, at 124--67.See also SMITH, supra
note 27, at 1-<i, 86-88, 470-71 (emphasizingthatAmericacombines democratic republican,
liberal, and inegalitarian ascriptive traditions).
3
° FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 22.
31
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF TilE AMERICAN REPUBUC, 1776-1787, at 59
(1969).
32
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 32-40.
33
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKriRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERAUSM 596-{;17 (1993).
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the 1830s many Americans accepted political parties. 34 Supposedly, parties furthered
the common good by promoting more widespread political participation. 35
Even so, political participation remained sharply limited under republican democracy. An alleged lack of civic virtue could, in theory, legitimate the forced political
exclusion of a societal group. Non-virtuous people supposedly would be unwilling
to forgo the pursuit of their own private interests." Partly on this pretext, African
Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, women, and other peripheral groups were precluded from participating in republican democracy for much of American history. 37
To take one instance, when large numbers of Catholic immigrants began coming to
the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant nativists condemned the
immigrants as unqualified for citizenship. 38 "'Protestantism favors Republicanism,"'
declared Samuel Morse, ''whereas 'Popery' supports 'Monarchical power. "'39 Unsurprisingly, then, conceptions of virtue and the common good typically mirrored the
interests and values of wealthy, white, Protestant men. 40
Under republican democracy, individual rights and liberties were protected from
undue government interference but were always subordinate to the government's
power to act for the common good. In the words of James Kent, ''private interest
must be made subservient to the general interest of the community.'"'' These principles, to a great degree, structured republican democratic judicial review. Courts would
review government actions to determine whether a disputed action was for the common good-and therefore permissible--or for partial and private interests-and
therefore impermissible. 42 In an 1845 case, a Boston entrepreneur sought to sell
34

EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA 197 (rev. ed. 1985).
ld. at 197-232; IIARRYL. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: T!IEPOUIICSOF JACKSONIAN
AMERICA 172-74 (1990). In fact, voter turnout soared during the middle decades of the nin<>teenth century. ERIK W. AUSTIN, POUIICAL FACTS OF TilE UNTIED STATES SINCE 1789, at
3 78-79 (1986).
" On exclusion of societal groups from the polity, see ALExANDERKEYSSAR, THERmm
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HisTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN TilE UNTIED STATES 54-60 (2000);
SMITH, supra note 27, at 170-73.
37
SANDEL, supra note 15, at318; SMITH, supra note 27, at 85. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERSINTIIELAND:PATTERNSOFAMERICANNATIVISM, 1860-1925,at6(2ded.l988)
(discussing the condemnation of Catholic immigrants).
38
HIGHAM, supra note 3 7, at 6.
39
SMITH, supra note 27, at 209.
4
For example, during the late nineteenth century, as the nation industrialized, large corporations sought restrictions on governmeut regulation by arguing that the common good was
commensurate with laissez faire. See, e.g., Millettv. People, 7N.E. 631,635-36 (1886) (invalidating a law preventing coal companies from cheating their miners when weighing the quantity
mined); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON TilE LiMITATIONS OF POUCE POWER IN
TilE UNITED STATES 4-5 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886) (recognizing the power of governments
to act for the common good but arguing that such exercises of power were rare).
41
2JAMESKENT, COMMENrARIESONAMERICANLAW276 (1827).
42
FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 26-32; GillMAN, supra note 15, at 51-55; WllllAMJ.
35

°
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poultry he had acquired in New Hampshire, but in doing so, he violated a municipal
regulation of the marketplace. 43 The city required a seller to show "that all the said
articles are the produce of his own farm, or of some farm not more than three miles
distant from his own dwelling-house.'""' The seller objected, contending that "the
by-law is contrary to common right, in restraint of trade, against public policy,
unreasonable and void.'"'' In an opinion by Lemuel Shaw, the court upheld the
regulation, reasoning that the city had provided "accommodations" for sales by
"actual producers.",. Consequently, the city had "a right so to control them, as best
to promote the welfare of all the citizens. And we think they are well calculated to
promote the public and general benefit," notwithstanding the restrictions on the
economic marketplace. 47
Courts treated free-expression rights similarly to other individual rights. Following the general republican democratic approach to judicial review, the predominant
doctrinal framework for analyzing free-expression claims was the bad tendency test. 48
While "the government could not impose prior restraints ... it could impose criminal
penalties for speech or writing that had bad tendencies or likely harmful consequences.'"'' According to Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,
the government could punish speakers and writers for "what is improper, mischievous,
or illegal. " 50 In other words, courts upheld government actions punishing expression
likely to produce bad tendencies precisely because such speech or writing undermined virtue and contravened the common good. 51
The Supreme Court of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave no
greater protection to free expression than did other courts. In fact, the Court often
skirted free-expression issues,52 and when the Justices acknowledged such an issue,
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE 19-234 (1996). See, e.g., State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn.
(2 Yer.) 599 (1831); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
43
Commonwealth v. Rice, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 253-54,256,259 (1845).
44
Id. at 256.
45
Id. at 258.
46
Id. at 258-59.
47 Id.
48
FElDMAN, FAn.ING CONS1TIUTION, supra note 29, at 61.
49
!d. The bad tendency test developed from the truth-conditional standard tbat first emerged
in seditious libel cases. FElDMAN, supra note 13, at II 0-18; Genevieve Lakier, The Invention
ofLow-Value Speech, 128 HAR.v. L. REv. 2166,2184--86 (2015) (referring to this standard as
the "truth-plus defense'').
50
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TilE CONS1TIUTION OF TilE UNITED STATES 736
(1833).
51
SeeKnowlesv. United States, 170F. 409(8thCir.l909);Updegraphv. Commonwealth,
11 Serg. &Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealthv. Morris, 3 Va. (IVa. Cas.) 176(1811).
52
Mut. Fihn Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915)(rejectingaclaim
that a licensing requirement amounted to a prior restraint, the Court reasoned "that the exhibition of moving pictores is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit'').
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they tended to treat it as an aspect of due-process liberty. 53 In Halter v. Nebraska, 54
decided in 1907, the Court upheld the conviction under a state flag-desecration
statute of defendants who used the American flag on beer bottles." Justice John
Marshall Harlan's majority opinion discussed free expression at length, but as an
aspect of due-process liberty rather than as a First Amendment right per se." He
began by explicating the powers of a republican democratic government: "[A]
[s]tate possesses all legislative power consistent with a republican form of government; therefore each [s ]tate ... may, by legislation, provide not only for the health,
morals and safety of its people, but for the common good, as involved in the wellbeing, peace, happiness and prosperity of the people."57 Thus, as Harlan explained,
"[i]t is familiar law that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights inhering in
personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such reasonable restraints as may
be required for the general good."" More specifically, then, free expression, as an aspect of personal liberty, was subordinate to any state actions promoting the common
good. 59 In this particular case, the protection of the flag from desecration, including
its use "for purposes of trade and traffic," would further the common good. 60 A state
would "be wanting in care for the well-being of its people if it ignores the fact that
they regard the flag as a symbol of their country's power and prestige, and will be
impatient if any open disrespect is shown towards it.,,.,
The Court did not explicitly address free expression under the First Amendment
until the World War I era. In a series of cases arising from Espionage Act prosecutions, Justice Oliver Wendell Hohnes, Jr., articulated the scope of protection under
the First Amendment with a multitude ofphrasings. 62 Regardless ofHohnes' s terminology, he resolved each case in accordance with the bad tendency test. 63 In Schenck
v. United States,64 two leaders of the Socialist party were convicted for distributing
a leaflet that had opposed the war-time draft. 65 The defendants argued that the First
Amendment protected their expression. 66 A unanimous Court upheld the convictions. 67 With regard to the scope of free expression, Hohnes stated: "The question
53

See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
205 u.s. 34 (1907).
" Id. at 46.
56
See id. at 40-43.
51
Id. at 40-41.
58
Id. at 42.
59
See id. at 40-42.
60
Id. at 42.
61
Id.
62
See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
63
See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
64
249 u.s. 47 (1919).
65
Id. at 48-49.
66
Id. at 51.
61
Id. at 53.
54
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in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.,,., Holmes's 'clear and present
danger' tenninology was novel, yet his application of the test demonstrated that he
did not intend to pronounce a new standard for delineating the scope of free expression.69 For Holmes (and the Court), clear and present danger meant bad tendency.
In the subsequent Espionage Act cases, Frohwerk v. United States 10 and Debs
v. United States, 71 Holmes continued to follow bad-tendency principles, though he
disregarded his 'clear and present danger' tenninology. 72 For instance, Holmes's
opinion in Debs approved a jury instruction that presented the bad tendency test in
conventional terms--the jurors, as charged, "could not find the defendant guilty for
advocacy of any ofhis opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency
and reasonably probable effect [to violate the law], and unless the defendant had the
specific intent to do so in his mind. " 73 This frrst set of World War I cases revealed
that all of the Justices believed the government could punish expression impeding
the national war effort because such expression was harmful or had bad tendencies,
in contravention of the common good.
Throughout the 1920s, the Court would continue to apply the bad-tendency
standard to fmd speech and writing constitutionally unprotected. 74 But in the next
set of Espionage Act cases, decided only months after Debs, Holmes (along with
Justice Louis Brandeis) began dissenting and arguing for more expansive First
Amendment protections. 75 Although Holmes would never admit as much, the arguments ofa young Harvard professor, Zechariah Chafee, probably shaped Holmes's new
68

!d. at 52.
Holmes apparently derived the 'clear and present danger' language from his book, The
Common Law. OUVER WENDEI.LHOI.MES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 66--68 (Little, Brown &
Company ed. 1945) (1881). See G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of
Free Speech .Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAUF.L.REv. 391, 414--19 (1992) (discussing Holmes's understanding of criminal attempts and how it shaped his clear and present
danger test). But see David M. Rabban, The Emergence ofModern First Amendment Doctrine, SOU. Cin.L.REv.1205, 1271-78 (1983)(arguingthatthis connection was probable but
not definite).
70
249 u.s. 204 (1919).
71
249 u.s. 211 (1919).
72
Id.; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204.
73
Debs, 249 U.S. at 216.
74
See generally United States ex rei. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub!' g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921) (holding that the removal of second-class mailing privileges pursuant
to the Espionage Act did not infringe on a publications rigbt of free speech); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (upholding the convictions ofthreenewspaperpublishers
for wilfully making statements that migbt weaken the United States' war effort).
75
Burleson,255U.S. at417-38 (Brandeis, J. &Holmes, I., dissenting); Schaefor,251 U.S.
at 482-95 (Brandeis, J. & Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624--31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69
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approach to free expression. 76 Chafee had published an article arguing for stronger
constitutional protections based on Holmes's own 'clear and present danger' terminology. 77 Chafee justified a more expansive First Amendment, going beyond bad
tendency principles by invoking a search-for-truth rationale. 78 Jolm Milton had first
articulated this rationale in 1644 (during the English Civil War),79 and Jolm Stuart
Mill had reiterated it in 1859. 8°Foilowing in their path, Chafee linked an individual
speaker's right to (or interest in) free expression with a societal interest in the search
for truth: "The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread of truth
on subjects of general concern. This is possible ouly through absolutely unlimited
discussion .... " 81
In Abrams v. United States, 82 decided in 1919, the Court once again upheld
convictions under the Espionage Act. 83 Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented,
reasoning that the defendants' expression should be constitutionally protected. 84
Like Chafee, Holmes relied on the clear and present danger test, but now with more
bite than the bad tendency standard. 85 Also, like Chafee, Holmes justified First
Amendment protections based on a societal search for truth:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the ouly ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 86
76

See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 272-81 (explaining Holmes's changed attitude toward
free expression).
77
See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom ofSpeech in War Time, 32 HARv. L.REv. 932 (1919)
[hereinafter Chafee, War Time]. Chafee based this article on an earlier essay. Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Freedom ofSpeech, 17 NEW REPu!luc 66 (1918).
78
Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 956--60.
79
Jolm Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the
Parliament ofEngland (Grolier Club 1890) (1644).
80
JOHN STUART MILL, ONLIBERT¥21-27 (Currin Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956)
(1859). Chafee cited both Milton and Mill. Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 932-33 n.l,
954-55.
81

Chafee, War Time, supra note 77, at 956.

250 u.s. 616 (1919).
!d.
84
See id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I cannot put into more impressive words
my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived oftheir
rights under the Constitution ....'').
" !d. at 627-28.
86
Id. at 630.
82

83
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Holmes linked the clear and present danger test with the search-for-truth rationale. 87
The government, he explained, should allow speech and writing to flow into a marketplace ofideas. 88 From this free exchange of ideas, the truth will emerge." Harmful
ideas must be met with better ideas--counter-speech-rather than with force or suppression. 90 The ouly ideas (speech and writing) that should be restricted are those
that would inhibit the further exchange ofideas-namely, those that would engender
a clear and present (or imminent) danger of unlawful or harmful conduct."

B. Pluralist Democracy: Expansive First Amendment Protection
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, multiple societal forces
strained the republican democratic regime of government. 92 Because of immigration,
the population grew increasingly diverse." The agrarian economy transformed with
industrialization and people left their rural homes to live in the "burgeoning cities.,,.,.
"[O]ld-stock Americans" fought these changes in different ways. 95 For instance, in
the 1920s, the government placed severe quotas on the immigration of eastern and
southern Europeans, deemed to be "racially inferior to Anglo-Saxon[ s]. " 96 Likewise,
surging nativism helped engender Prohibition as a religious and cultural strike against
Catholics." States introduced new laws limiting suffrage, supposedly to weed out
corruption and create "a more competent electorate,"" yet these laws typically prevented immigrants and the poor from voting. 99

87
88
89

90

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

Holmes did not use the precise phrase, ''marketPlace ofideas." See VincentBlas~ Holmes
and the Marketplace ofideas, 2004 SUP. Cr.REv.1, 24n.80 (noting the first use ofthis phrase
was in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965), decided more than forty years after Holmes's Abrams dissent).
92
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 166.
" See id. at 170-71.
94
See id. at 166-78 (discussing in greater detail the development and effects of indus91

trialization, urbanization, and innnigration).
" Id. at 171.
96
/d. SeeU.S.lMMIGRATIONCOMM'N,DICTIONARYOFRACESORPEOPLES,S.DOC.N0.662
(3d Sess. 1911) (describing racial differences ofvarious innnigrant groups); E. P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POUCY, 1798-1965, at 187-92 (1981 ).
97
JOSEPH R. GUSFIE!D, SYMBOUC CRUSADE: STATUS POUTICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 122-23 (1963).
98
KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 128.
" See id. at 128-29 (describing measures that prevented voting); ARTHURS. LINK &
RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 53-55 (1983) (emphasizing reduced voting in poor
and innnigrant communities).
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Despite the reactionary backlash from old-stock Americans, republican democracy was failing by the late 1920s.""' The onset of the Great Depression precipitated
its demise. 101 The nineteenth-century agrarian, rural, and relatively homogeneous
American society was no more. 102 During the 1930s, massive numbers of immigrants and their children became part of the American polity; ethnic and immigrant
urbanites who had previously been discouraged from partaking in national politics103
became voters, casting their support for the New Deal. 104 As a practical matter,
mainstream and old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the republican
democratic ideals ofvirtue and the common good, were now to be balanced with the
values of other Americans who constituted the demographically diverse population.105 No single set of cultural values was authoritative. 106 Ethical relativism took
hold as a political reality: all values, all interests--or at least a plurality of values
and interests-mattered to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers. 107 Democracy
now revolved around the assertion of interests and values by sundry individuals and
groups. 108 The pursuit of self-interest no longer amounted to corruption; rather it
defined the nature of (pluralist) democracy.'" Thus, for example, legislation favoring labor unions was no longer condemned as pursuing only partial or private
interests, as it had been under republican democracy. 110 Labor and management now
seemed to stand on the same footing--they both constituted legitimate interest groups,
as did all other politically motivated groups. 111 Diverse voluntary organizations and
interest groups openly sought to press their claims through the democratic process. 112
10° FElDMAN, supra note 13,at314.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 166--97.
103 See KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 128-29.
104 See AN'IHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSIONYEARS, 1933-40, at 248-49
(1989); COHEN, supra note 15, at254--57, 362-{;6; WIIllAME.LEuCHTENBURG,FRANKr.iN
D. ROOSEVELT ANDTHENEWDEAL 1932-1940, at 184 (1963).
10' See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 316.
106 See id. at 316-17,341.
107 See id. at316-17; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive
Government at the CommonwealthClub(Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 THEPUllUCPAPERSANDAJ>.
DRESSESOFFRANKLIND.ROOSEVELT742, 742-56 (1938). Roosevelt was far more solicitous
ofAfrican American interests than any previous president, yet be often sacrificed black interests
and values so as to keep white Southerners aligned with the Democratic party. FElDMAN, supra
note 13, at 327-28. Also, Roosevelt eventually bmke with and became antagonistic toward
big business. See id. at 318-19,324.
108 See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 316.
109 See id. at 321.
110 See id. at 320-21.
111 See id. at 320. See also JEROlD S. AUERBACH, LABORANDLIBERTY: THE LAFOLLETTE
COMMITIEEAND THENEWDEAL27-53 (1966); MELVYNDuBOFSKY, THE STATE&LABOR
IN MODERN AMERICA 107-34 (1994).
112
See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 341.
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Lobbying-illegal during the republican democmtic era-"became open, aggressive, and institutionalized."113
By the end of the 193 Os, political theorists had begun to elabomte the new form
of democmcy. The foundation for the incipient democratic theory was the scholarly
embrace of relativism. 114 While totalitarian governments, such as those in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, claimed knowledge of objective values and forcefully
imposed those values and concomitant goals on their peoples, 115 democmtic governments allowed their citizens to express multiple values and goals. 116 The key to democracy lay not in the specification of supposedly objective goals, such as the common
good, but rather in the following of processes that allowed all citizens to voice their
respective values and interests within a free and open democmtic arena. 117 After World
War II, numerous political theorists celebrated pluralist democracy. The only way to
determine public values and goals, they explained, is "through the free competition of
interest groups." 118 By "composing or compromising'' their different values and interests, 119 the "competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs they can
all support."120 Legislative decisions therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and
the exertion of pressure through the normal channels of the democratic process. 121
From this perspective, the government appears to provide a neutral framework of
processes or procedures that allows individuals and interest groups to assert their
respective values and interests. 122
For much of the 1930s, conservative Supreme Court Justices resisted the transition to pluralist democracy and attempted to continue enforcing republican
113

!d. at 322-23.
See id. at 330.
ns Id. at 331.

114

116

7 JOHN DEWEY, E11l!CS(l932), reprinted in THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 359
(JoAnn Boydston ed., 1985).
117
SANDEL, supra note 15, at 250 (discussing the transition to procedural republic or
democracy).
118
WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALcOlM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN Pouncs:
THE NATIONAL GoVERNMENT 9 (1949).
119
120
121

!d.
!d. at 8.

FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 332. Robert Dahl developed the most comprehensive
explanation of the democratic process. See ROBERT A DABL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEoRY (1956) [hereinafter DABL, DEMOCRATIC THEoRY]; ROBERT A DABL, A PREFACE TO
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) [hereinafter DABL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A.
DABL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs (1989) [hereinafter DABL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs];
ROBERT A. DABL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS TilE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (200 I) [hereinafter
DABL, HOW DEMOCRATIC].
122
See FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 396; JOHN RAWLS, POUTICAL LmERAUSM (1993)
(articulating the philosophy ofpolitical hberalism); SANDEL, supra note 15, at3-24, 28,250--73
(explaining the procedural republic).
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democratic principles.'" By the end of the decade, however-193 7 was a turning
point-the Court had accepted the transition and stopped emphasizing virtue and the
common good. 124 But the Court's abandonment of republican democracy created a
problem: ifjudicial review had largely revolved around the republican democratic principles of virtue and the common good, how should the Court structure judicial review
under pluralist democracy? The Justices experimented with different approaches. 125
During this time period, for instance, the Court first began using balancing tests to
resolve constitutional issues. 126 In congressional power cases, though, the Court
emphasized deference to the democratic process. 127 Significantly, before the 1930s,
the Justices rarely even mentioned democracy, but after the 193 7 turn, they regularly
discussed democratic participation. 128
In the realm of free expression, the rejection of republican democratic judicial
review led the Justices to abandon the bad tendency test. 129 The Court and numerous
commentators recognized that the emergent pluralist democracy depended on free
speech more fundamentally than had republican democracy. 130 At least as far back as
the framing, commentators had linked free expression-most often, a free pressith free government. 131 This link was always conceived from within the parameters
ofrepublican democracy; 132 hence, the emphasis on free rather than selfgovernment.
Most commonly, Republican democratic theorists would emphasize that free expression helped check the potential for government officials to become corrupt and
123

See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal
ConservationActofl935); R.R. Ret Bd v. AltonR.R. Co.,295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935).
124
SeeNLRBv. Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp.,301 U.S. I (1937)(upholdingtheNational
Labor RelationsActofl935); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(upholding
a state minimwn wage statute); FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 349-59 (discussing the 1937
switch); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT
429-43 (2010).
m See SANDEL, supra note 15, at47-54 (discussing the Court's efforts to reconceptualize
judicial review).
126
See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age ofBalancing,
96 YAIEL.J. 943 (1987).
127
See, e.g., Wickardv. Filburn, 317U.S.lll (1942)(upholdingproductionquotasofthe
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193 8).
128

MortonJ. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution ofChange: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 1071fARv. L. REv. 30, 56-57 (1993) (discussing the emerging importsnce
ofdemocracy). See JOHN H. ELY,DEMOCRACY AND Dis1RUST(l980) {emphasizing connections

between pluralist democracy and judicial review).
129
The first case in which the Court arguably upheld a free speech claim was decided in 1931.
Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359(1931). FElDMAN, supra note 13, at388-89 (discussing
whether the Court based its decision on First Amendment grounds).
130
See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 391-92.
131
Id. at 56, 63.
132
Id. at 391.
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contravene the common good. 133 The press, in particular, acted like a watchdog,
sniffing out the unvirtuous. 134
But with the onset of pluralist democracy, free expression appeared to perform a
different and more crucial role. Soon after the Court began to defer to the democratic
process in congressional power cases, Justice Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene
Products questioned whether such deference was appropriate when legislation either
infringed liberties protected by the Bill ofRights, including free expression, restricted
participation in democratic processes, or discriminated "against discrete and insular minorities. " 135 As the Justices and commentators recognized, free expression had become
integral to the (pluralist) democratic process itself. 136 The people must be able to openly
express their values and interests in the political arena. 137 Without free expression,
pluralist democracy could not exist. 138 Thus, the so-called self-governance rationale
was born. 139
Pursuant to the self-governance rationale, free expression allows diverse groups
and individuals to contribute their views in the pluralist political arena. 140 "If govermnental officials interfere[] with the pluralist ... process," if they dictate or control
"public debates, then they ... skew the democratic outcomes and undermine the
consent of the governed." 141 In his 1948 book, Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment, Alexander Meiklejohn emphasized that the need to protect political
expression "springs from the necessities of the program ofself-govermnent,"142 or in
other words, from "the structure and functioning of our political system as a whole. " 143
Thus, partly because of the self-governance rationale, free expression became a
133

!d. at 396.
See id. at 57--{i3. Some republican democratic theorists would add that free expression
eocouraged virtuous citizeos to promote the common good. Id at 396. Wbeo Justice Brandeis
explained free expression in his Whitney concurreoce, he discussed the relation between free
expression and governmeot from this republican democratic perspective. Whitneyv. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also FElDMAN, supra note 13,
134

at 385-86 (explaining Brandeis's viewpoint).
135
United States v. Caro1eoe Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
136
FELDMAN, supra note 13, at 396.
137

See id.
!d. See W. Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943); DAHL,
DEMOCRACY ANDITSCRmcs,supranote 121, at 169--75; HanyKalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment, " 1964 SUP. CT. REv.
138

191, 208 (emphasizing the importance of free expression).
139

FrederickScbauer,FreeSpeechandtheArgumentfromDemocracy,inLIBERALDEMOCat 241, 245-47 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983).
SeeFEI.DMAN,supranote 13, at316.
Id.

RACY: NOMOS XXV,
140
141
142

ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

26 (1948).
143
Id. at 18.
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constitutional lodestar under pluralist democracy. 144 In a stark about-face from the
Court's consistent repudiation of First Amendment claims during the republican
democratic era, the Justices began to uphold one free speech claim after another. 145
The principles of free expression and pluralist democracy are often combined
to engender a mandate for government neutrality. 146 If pluralist democracy arises
from the recognition that the people harbor diverse interests and values (ethical
relativism), 147 then the people must be allowed to express and advocate for their
respective interests and values in the democratic arena. 148 The government provides
the framework of processes for people to express their views but cannot dictate the
substance or content of those views. 149 In 1943, the Court explained: "If there is any
fiXed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."150
II. FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS

The interrelated historical evolutions of free expression and democracy shed light
on the current campus free speech disputes, particularly those involving the granting
of a platform to controversial speakers. A recent encounter at the Lewis and Clark Law
School provides a useful illustration. 151 The Federalist Society,152 a conservative student
organization, invited Christina HoffSommers, a philosopher and resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, 153 to speak at Lewis and Clark. 154 Sommers is wellknown for her inflammatory conservative political stances. 155 She questions the
144

G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence ofFree Speech
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1996).
1
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is pro"

tected free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a conviction for
distributing handbills); Haguev. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307U.S. 496,517 (1939) (upholding
the right ofuoions to organize in the streets).
146
See SANDEL, supra note 15, at 28 (emphasizing demaods for govemmeot neutrality).
147
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 396.
148

149

See id.
See id.

150

W. Virginia St.Bd. ofEduc. v.Barnette,319U.S. 624, 642(1943). "[A]boveallelse, the
FirstAmendmeotmeaos that government has no power to restrict expression because ofits message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."PoliceDep'tv. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972).
151
Scott Jaschik, Speech, Interrupted, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.in
sidehighered.com/news/2018/03/06/stodents-interrupt-several-portions-speech-christina-hoff
-summers [http://perma.cc/ZQ2G-SQYC].
152
For a discussion on the development and operation ofthe Federalist Society, see SlEVEN
M. TEIES, THERisEOFTilECONSERVATIVELEGALMOVEMENT 135--80 (2008).
153
Christina Hoff Sommers, AEI, https://www.aei.org/scholar/christina-hoff-sommers
[http://permacc/W3MQ-698H] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
154
Jaschik, supra note 151.
'" Id.
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usefulness of women's studies departments, the reality of a wage gap between women
and men, and the need to advocate against sexual assaults. 156 When she visited Lewis
and Clark, a group of student protesters attempted to block the door to the room
where Sommers was scheduled to speak. 157 When the audience entered through a
back entrance and Sommers began to speak, the protesters repeatedly interrupted the
presentation, which nonetheless continued. 158 Some protesters sang, "Which side are
you on, friends? Which side are you on? No platform for fascists, no platform at all.
We will fight for justice until Christina's gone."159 The co-chair of the Lewis and
Clark National Lawyers Guild Student Chapter explained her interest in protecting
equality and inclusiveness: "I think first and foremost what's on my mind is protesting giving a platform to someone who espouses essentially hate speech, male
supremacy speech."160
Many reacted angrily against the protesters and argued that they contravened the
free speech rights of Sommers. 161 Because Lewis and Clark, a private school, and
its students do not represent the government, the protesters technically could not
violate Sommers's constitutional rights. 162 Yet, the critics of these protesters reasonably invoked free speech values or norms, as do many disputants in these campus
controversies. 163
156
See Christina Hoff Sommers, There Is No Gender Wage Gap, PRAGERU (Mar. 6, 2017);
Jaschik, supra note 151; Scott London, The Future ofFeminism: An Interview With Christina
HoffSommers, Scorr LONDON, http://www.scottlondon.com/interviews/sonnners.html [http:/I
perma.cc/A5FW-UB83] Qast visited Apr. 11, 2019).
157
Jaschik, supra note 151.

"' Id.
'" Id.
160
Protesters Disrupt Speech by Author at Lewis & Clark Law School, STATESMAN J.
(Mar. 7, 2018), https:/lwww.statesmanjournal.com/stmy/news/20 18/03/07/protesters-disrupt
-speech-author-lewis-clar-law-school/404865002 [http://perma.cc/4256-AFRD]. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 795, 798--802 (1993) (emphasizing
equality when discussing campus hate speech).
161
Mairead McArdle, Law-School Students Shout Dawn 'Known Fascist' Christino Hoff
Sommers, NAT'LREv. (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:04 AM), https:/lwww.nationalreview.com/2018/03
/christina-hoff-sonnners-lewis-clark-law-studenls-shout-<lown [http://perma.cc!K8LW-CRDS].
162
WlllTTINGTON, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing relation between private schools and free
speech issues). See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.

522 (1987) (applying the state-action doctrine).
163
"Although the First Amendment applies only to public universities, all colleges and universities should commit themselves to these [First Amendment] values." CIIEMERINSKY &
GillMAN, supra note 5, at 20; Charlotte Hays, 'Freedom ofSpeech 'Is Too Sophisticated a Conceptfor Today 's Illiberal Students, lilEHIIL (Mar. 9, 2018), https://thehillcom/opinionleduca
tion/377648-freedom-<lf-speech-is-too-sophisticated-a-concept-for-todays-illiberal [http://penna
.cc/5FJS-7SJX]. See CIIEMERINSKY & GillMAN, supra note 5, at 71-73 (arguing against noplatform policies); McArdle, supra note 161 (noting that the Federalist Society maintained
that Sommers stood for free expression).
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A. Free Speech Criticisms of the Protesters
Critics typically articulate several overlapping free expression arguments to reproach protesters. First, critics start with a presumption that expression should be protected: let the controversial speaker express her views; ifthe protesters disagree with the
speaker, then they should respond in kind, by expressing their own countering views. 164
In other words, critics maintain that protesters should operate within the marketplace
of ideas in a societal search for troth. 165 Good ideas are the appropriate response to bad
ideas; the protesters should express their disagreement by using counter-speech rather
than suppression (for instance, shouting down an invited speaker). 166 In the Lewis and
Clark situation, the protesters should have allowed Sommers to complete her presentation, and then, ifthey disagreed, the protesters should have voiced their own alternative
ideas. Tbrough this orderly exchange of ideas, society supposedly will move closer
to the truth. 167 If anything, a campus should epitomize the marketplace of ideas. 168
Even if the speaker offends the protesters, the critics continue, the First Amendment does not allow the punishment or suppression of offensive expression. 169
People speak and write all sorts of nasty and even purposefully cruel epithets, some
of which might diminish equality and inclusiveness (for example, in a campus community). 170 Yet, suffering through such offenses is the price of free expression. 171
Otherwise, the government would become a censor, specifying which pronouncements are too offensive and which are acceptable. 172 The government, though, must
remain neutral about the content of messages. 173
For example, the Court held in Cohen v. California114 that the defendant's
conviction for disturbing the peace violated the First Amendment. 175 To protest the
164

See BEN-PORAIH, supra note 5, at 39.
See MARTIN P. GOLDING, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 16-17 (2000).
BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at39; CIIEMERINSKY &GilLMAN, supra note 5, at 19-20;
PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17; WIITITINGTON, supra note 5, at 28-50. For a critique of the
marketplace of ideas, see DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note I, at 33-39.
167
See GOLDING, supra note 165, at 16-17.
168
Id. at 15-18; Wlll1TINGTON, supra note 5, at 6, 29.
169
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (20ll)(reasoning that the First Amendment
16

'
166

protects "even hurtful speech on public issues").
170
Although they argue to protect free expression, Chemerinsky and Gilhnan acknowledge
the need to trY to protect equality and inclusiveness on campuses. CiJEMERINSKY & GillMAN,
supra note 5, at ix-x, I.
171
Id. at 72-73. "Our position is absolute: campuses never can censor or punish the expression of ideas, however offensive, because otherwise they cannot perfurm their function of
promoting inquiry, discovery, and the dissemination of new knowledge." !d. at 19-20.
172
!d. at 73.
173
"The platform that campuses provide is designed to be an open platform, not one
reserved for those who are thinking correct thoughts." Id. at 73. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC,
supra note I, at 53-{)2 (criticizing free speech absolutism).
174
403 u.s. 15 (1971).
m Id. at 26.
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military draft during the Vietnam War, Cohen had worn into a courthouse a jacket
inscribed with the message, "Fuck the Draft. " 176 The Court acknowledged that ''freedom
[of expression] may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance. " 177 But chaotic and insulting statements are "necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve."178
After all, the Court reasoned, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."179 The government therefore must remain neutral. 180 Ultimately, "[t]hat the air may at times seem
filled with verbal cacophony is ... not a sign of [national] weakness but of strength. " 181
As critics have explained, the Lewis and Clark situation and similar no-platforming disputes resonate with hostile audience cases. 182 In a hostile audience scenario,
a speaker's words inflame an unfriendly audience to a point where some in the
audience might react violently. 183 In such scenarios, should the police either, on the
one hand, halt and arrest the speaker (for provoking potential violence) or, on the
other hand, control the crowd and protect the speaker (thus allowing the speaker to
continue)? To be sure, in one such case, decided in 1951, the Court upheld a speaker's
conviction for disorderly conduct. 184 The Justices reasoned that the speaker's expression created a clear and present danger of violence and therefore was constitutionally unprotected. 185 But in more recent cases, the Court has effectively required the
police to try reasonably to protect the speakers from a hostile audience. 186 The vehemence of hecklers cannot terminate a speaker's First Amendment rights. 187 Thus, in
the Lewis and Clark situation, school officials (acting in the role of government officials) should have protected the right of the speaker, Sommers, to complete her presentation. ifprotesters insisted on interfering, the school should have punished them. 188
176
177

178
179
180

181
182

!d. at 16.
!d. at 24--25.
Id. at 25.
See id.
See id. at 25-26.
Id. at 25.

SeeR George Wright, TheHeclder's Veto Today, 68CASEW.REs.L.REv.l59, 161-09,
178--84 (2017) (summarizing hostile audience jurisprudence and relating it to campus free
speech disputes).
183
See id. at 160.
184
Feinerv. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
1
" See id. at 319--20.
186
See Gregoryv. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112(1969); Coxv. Louisiana, 379U.S. 536,558
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-3 8 (1963). For a discussion emphasizing
the heckler's veto in campus free speech disputes, see Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Does Disruption Violate Free Speech?, C!!RON. HIGHER EDuc. (Oct. 17, 20 17), https://www
.chronicle.com/article/Does-Disruption-VioJ.ate.Free/241470 [http://perma.cc/249J-2A3V].
187
See, e.g., Gregory, 394 U.S. at 121-22(Black, J.,concurriug)(discussingresponsibilities of police).
188
1be critics often condemn the protesters for being "snowflakes,'' see BEN-PORAIH, supra
note 5, at 9, 117 nn.6-7 (citing examples of such comments), or as trying to enforce ''political
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B. The Counterargument: From Democracy and Free Expression

These arguments for the unequivocal protection of expression in the no-platforming disputes, such as at Lewis and Clark, are mistaken in multiple ways. We
should remember that, from a historical standpoint, free expression became a constitutional lodestar only after the Court accepted pluralist democracy. 189 During the
republican democratic era, when Holmes, Brandeis, and free speech advocates emphasized the search-for-truth rationale (or marketplace of ideas theory), the majority of
Justices continued to apply the bad tendency test and to conclude that expression was
constitutionally unprotected. 190 Later on, in the late 193 Os and early 1940s, with the
development of pluralist democracy and the correlative self-governance rationale,
the Court began to validate free-expression claims under the First Amendment. 191
Significantly, then, critics (of the protesters) typically invoke the search-fortruth rationale rather than the self-governance to justify absolute protection of
expression, regardless of injurious potential or consequences. 192 The critics insist that
an invited speaker, even one spouting hate speech, has a protected right to speak. 193
If protesters want to respond, they should do so with counter-speech. 194 But given
that Supreme Court Justices and other judges consistently found that the government
could restrict expression despite the search-for-truth rationale, critics would fmd
fmner ground if they could invoke the self-governance rationale, the springboard
for the transformation of free expression into a constitutionallodestar. 195
In the context of campus free-expression disputes, however, the application of
the self-governance rationale is problematic. Pluralist democratic theory requires full
and equal participation for all citizens. 196 The preeminent theorist of pluralist democracy, Robert A. Dahl, specified the processes requisite to the operation of a democratic process. 197 For instance, each individual vote must be given an identical weight,
and the option receiving the greatest number of votes wins. 198 Dahl emphasized,
correctness." Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, I01 MINN.
L. REv. 1987, 1988-93 (2017).
189
See discussion supra Section I.B.
190
See discussion supra Section I.A.
191
See discussion supra Section I.B.
192
See GOWING, supra note 165, at 16-17.
193
See id.
194
See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17.
195
The search-for-truth counter-speech argument has other serious problems. See discussion infra Section II.B.
196
See FEWMAN, supra note 13, at 396.
197
See IRAKATZNELSON,DESOLATION ANDENUGIITENMENT 107-76 (2003) (arguing that
Dahl and several other post-World War II scholars soughtto articulate an approach to politics
and democracy that made sense in the shadow of recent world tragedies).
198
DAHL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 121, at 67; DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY,
supra note 121, at 59. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 121, at I 09-11
(discussing voting equality).
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though, that "effective participation" is the most important component ofdemocracy. 199
Citizens must have "adequate" and "equaf' opportunities "for expressing their preferences . . . for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for
endorsing one outcome rather than another."200 According to Dahl, in other words,

free expression derives its import from the crucial demand for full and equal participation in the democratic arena. 201 Free expression allows citizens to participate effectively in democracy. From this perspective, equal democratic participation is primary;
free expression is secondary. 202
Although Dahl emphasized the democratic process, he did not intend to suggest
that democracy is solely a matter of process. He has always insisted that pluralist
democracy cannot be sustained without democratic norms--a cultore of democracy. 203
1fcitizens are not widely committed to the rules of the democratic game-negotiation,
compromise, and coalition-building-then the political community will splinter into
sharply polarized interest groups. 204 Hence, when Dahl underscored participation in
democracy, he was not referring to a purely formal right of participation. To the
contrary, citizens must be personally and culturally vested in democratic norms as
well as having sufficient resources to participate. 205 People who lack the fundamentals
of housing, education, or medical care cannot fully engage in political discussion and
participation regardless of their desire to play by the rules of the game.206
Consequently, pluralist democracy contains inherent substantive limits or conditions. For instance, ifthe crux of the democratic process is effective participation,
then a legislatore cannot constitutionally enact a law that would abridge some citizens'
abilities and opportunities to participate--even if a supermajority of citizens and
legislators followed the proper processes in enacting the law. Certain govermnent
actions must be off the table, beyond democratic debate, because they would contravene the conditions necessary for robust pluralist democracy. All individuals,
regardless of subculture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal
citizens in good standing.'07 Even if a supermajority of Americans were to support
199

DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 121, at 109.

200
201

Id.

202

See id. at 170.
See id. at 169-75 (discussing free speech and other rights integral to the democratic

process).
203
DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 48-49.
204
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITics, supra note 121, at 172; DAHL, DEMOCRATIC
THEoRY, supra note 121, at4. See DANIELJ.BOORSTIN, THEGENIUSOFAMER!CANPOUTICS
162 (1953) (emphasizing a "genuine community of our values"); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GoVERNMENTAL PROCESS 129, 138,512-13 (1951) (emphasizing the rules ofthe game for
democracy).
205
See DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 150-52.
206
See id. at 132-33 (maintaining that liberty and equality are not in opposition); DAHL,
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 46 (emphasizing relative economic well-being).
207
See JEREMY WAlDRON, THEIIARMINHATE SPEECH5, 60-61 (2012)(discussingthe
relation between hate speech and being a citizen in good standing).
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a law discriminating against a racial minority, such government action must be
unconstitutional because it would relegate the racial minority to second-class democratic citizenship. 208
As Dahl underscored, whenever we raise the issue of constitutional rights, we
implicitly ask the question, "rights for whom?'"09 In other words, who belongs to
and can participate in the political community?210 Under republican democracy, this
question led to a focus on civic virtue. 211 Supposedly, only those individuals virtuous
enough to pursue the common good rather than their own private interests were
entitled to full and equal citizenship, to rights to speak and vote.212 But under pluralist
democracy, full and equal citizenship for all individuals is a premise of the srstem. 213
Without full and equal citizenship, allowing for equal political participation for all, then
pluralist democracy does not exist.214 In Dahl's words, "The demos must include all
adult members except transients and persons proven to be mentally defective. "215
John Hart Ely's constitutioual theory of representation reinforcement--and the
criticisms of it-underscore that the definition of democracy must include a substantive element; democracy cannot be reduced solely to processes. 216 In fact, though,
Ely argued that representation-reinforcement theory was purely process-based; when
208

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating a Michigan law prohibiting same-sex marriages); Osamudia R James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REv. 127,
147-63 (2017) (arguing for the need to recognize the identity of societal groups in equal
protection).
209
DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 132-33.
210
An implicit and correlative substantive question is what counts as participation. To some
extent, Dahl's discussions ofthe prerequisites or conditions for a democratic process answer
this question. See DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRiTics, supra note 121, at 109-11, 169-75.
Ultin3ately, then, the procedural and substantive components of democracy necessarily intertwine. We Cam3ot fully discuss democracy without accounting for process and substance. See
SMITH, supra note 27, at 491 (emphasizing that it is "morally imperative" to recognize the functions of political communities).
211
See FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 22.
212
Id. at 15, 22.
213
See DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC, supra note 121, at 136.
214
See id. at 135-37 (emphasizing political equality as an anchor for democracy); Emanuela
Lombardo & Petra Meier, Good Symbolic Representation: The Relevance ofInclusion, 51
POL. SCI. & POL. 327 (2018) (emphasizing that inclusion is normative or substantive).
215
DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 59-60. See Karen Celis & Sarah
Childs, Good Representatives and Good Representation, 51 PoL. Sa. &PoL. 314 (2018) (discussing how to measure political equality in the form of good democratic representation); Eline
Severs & Suzanne Dov~ Why We Need To Return To the Ethics ofPolitical Representation,
51 POL. SCI. &POL. 309 (2018) (discussing the same).
216
See ELY, supra note 128, at 101--02, 181. For criticisms, see Paul Brest, TJie Substance
ofProcess, 42 OinOST.L.J.131 (1981); Richard D. Parker, The PastofConstitutional TJieory-And Its Future, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 223 (1981 ); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge ofTown:
The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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the Court exercises its power of judicial review, reviewing the constitutionality of
a legislative action, the Court should "police" the democratic process but should
never enunciate or enforce substantive principles or values.' 17 Only the legislature,
when following the proper pluralist democratic processes, could determine appropriate
communal goals (or values). 218 When reviewing the constitutionality of a legislative
action, the Court needed tu defer to the legislative action so long as the democratic
process had been fair and open--regardless of the substantive content of the legislative action.219 But if the democratic process had been defective, then the Court should
deem the legislative action unconstitutional.220
The Court, Ely explained, can police the democratic process in two ways. 221
First, the Court can clear the channels of political change.222 Political "ins" cannot
be allowed to protect their power by choking the channels of political change and
permanently excluding the political "outs. "223 Denying or diluting the right to vote
through legislative malapportionment is a "quintessential stoppage" in the democratic process and therefore unconstitutional. 224 Second, the Court can facilitate the
representation of minorities.225 Democratic representatives cannot be allowed to
systematically disadvantage minorities because of hostility or prejudice. The
democratic process malfunctions if everyone is not "actually or virtually represented.'m6 Therefore, when a legislature intentionally discriminates against a minority for an improper motive, such as racial hostility, the Court should fmd the
legislative action unconstitutional. 227
As numerous critics pointed out, however, Ely's representation-reinforcement
theory was not purely process-based. 228 Political battles in pluralist democracy always produce winners and losers;229 some societal groups win while others lose. Yet
Ely argued that the Court should police the democratic process by facilitating the
217

ELY, supra note 128, at 73-104, I 06 (emphasizing representation-reinforcement theory
as process-based).
218
See id. at 103.
219
"The day is gone when this Court [strikes down]laws ... because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out ofharmony with a particular school ofthought" Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
220
In Harper v. Virginia Board qfE/ections, the Court held that poll taxes in state elections
were unconstitutional because, according to Ely, such taxes prevented some citizens from participating fully in the democratic process. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See ELY, supra nute 128, at 120.
221
See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
222
ELY, supra note 128, at 105-34.
223
Id. at 103.
224
See id. at 117.
225
Id. at 135-79.
226
See id. at 101.
227
See id. at 101, 117.
228
For a list of critics, see supra note 216.
229
See discussion irifi"a Section liLA.

972

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF R.!GHfS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:949

representation ofminorities. 230 To do so, the Court itselfhad to differentiate among the
numerous societal groups that had lost in the pluralist democratic arena.231 The Court
designated some such groups as discrete and insular minorities deserving special judicial protection while deeming other groups mere losers in the democratic process.232 But
this judicial designation of discrete and insular minorities required the Court to engage in exactly those substantive value choices supposedly forbidden by representationreinforcement theory; the Court needed to differentiate among the various groups of
democratic losers. 233 Rather than remaining neutral among societal groups (and their
respective values and interests), the Court was designating some groups for special
judicial protection. One critic, Paul Brest, commented that Ely had articulated a
process-based constitutional theory so artfully that his failure unwittingly demonstrated its impossibility: "John Hart Ely has come as close as anyone could to
proving that it can't be done.'"34 The criticisms of Ely's representation-reinforcement
theory underscore that we cannot discuss democracy as solely a matter of process. 235
We must also discuss the status of different societal groups within the democratic
community-a substantive issue. Do all groups have full and equal standing?236
Understanding the substantive component of pluralist democracy is crucial to
analyzing campus free-<ll<prtlssion controversies, particularly no-platforming disputes.
Even though political speech and writing, in general, is robustly protected because
of the self-governance rationale,237 the reason for constitutionally protecting such
expression is to preserve democracy."' If campus speakers are allowed to denigrate
or denounce historically marginalized groups (or individual members of such
groups), then those targeted groups and individuals are pushed into a diminished
democratic status. Some individuals, when thrust into such second-class positions,
will react by remaining silent. 239 Others will hazard to participate, to speak or write,
yet their words and ideas must overcome the disadvantages of a diminished communal
status. As Jeremy Waldron explained: "The issue is ... the harm done to individuals
and groups through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public, and
230

ELY, supra note 128, at 120.
See id. at 151-53.
232 Id.
233
Brest, supra note 216, at 140. See Parker, supra note 216, at 234-35 (arguing similarly).
234
Brest, supra note 216, at 142.
235
See SANDEL, supra note 15, at 274-316 (emphasizing the difficulties of a procedural
republic).
236
See SlEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZmLATI, How DEMOCRACIES DIE 97-100 (2018)
(emphasizing the need to enhance and protect democratic norms in order to protect democratic govermnent); James, supra note 208, at 128-29 (emphasizing the importance of societal
identity in equal protection).
237
See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
238
See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
239
See BEN-PORAIH, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing the potential for silencing outsiders
on a campus).
231
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semi-permanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the
community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of equal
citizenship. " 240 A fair and open democratic dialogue or exchange of ideas is impossible if social power is skewed before the dialogue even begins. 241
In short, expression that diminishes the full and equal status ofmarginalized groups
or their members within the political community is not worthy of constitutional value
and should not be protected under the First Amendment. Full and equal citizenship for
marginalized groups should not be treated as if it were an issue open for debate. Equal
citizenship for marginalized groups should be treated as among the "settled features
of the social environment to which we are visibly and pervasively conunitted. " 242 Crucially, then, in the context ofthe no-platforming disputes, counter-speech cannot sufficiently respond to right-wing provocateurs who spout hate speech or otherwise
denigrate outsiders. Counter-speech legitimates debate about the issue of full and equal
citizenship. Counter-speech suggests that we ought to be engaged in conversation
with those who would label and treat marginalized groups as second-class citizens.
But there is no conversation to be had. We no longer need to try to persuade racists,
sexists, homophobes, or anyone else that all citizens deserve full and equal membership
in the polity. The conversation is over and off the table--or at least it should be.
Furthermore, to show that hate speech and the like are outside constitutional
protection in specific contexts, nobody should need to prove that such expression
creates imminent danger, psychological injury, risk of illegal conduct, or anything
else. 243 The problem with such expression does not lie in its potential harmful consequences. Instead, the problem lies in the reality that such expression necessarily
and inherently contravenes the requisite substantive conditions for pluralist democracy. Or to rephrase, the harmful consequence of such expression is precisely that
it undermines democracy, regardless of any other consequences.244
From this perspective, the government (or a university or college) cannot remain
neutral and should not try to do so. Because pluralist democracy contains inherent
substantive limits or conditions,245 government cannot be neutral. The government
240

WAlDRON, supra note 207, at 33.
See id. at 33, 47.
242
Id at95. See DaraZ. Strolovitch& Cbaya Y. Crowder, Respectability, Anti-Respectability,
and Intersectionally Responsible Representation, 51 PoL. SCI. & PoL. 340 (2018) (arguing
241

that marginalized groups should not need to prove their worthiness in accord with mainstream values).
243
See WAIDRON, supra note 207, at 96--97 (rejecting the judicial use of a doctrine such
as the clear and present danger test in cases of hate speech).
244
For discussions ofwhy hate speech should be constitotionally unprotected, see Richard
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racia/Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Marl J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
245
See supra notes 201--07 and accompanying text.

974

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF R.!GHfS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:949

should affirmatively nurture democratic culture and should ensure that all citizens can
fully and equally participate in the polity (or campus community).246 Ifthe government
allows a speaker to spout epithets that target a marginalized group, the government is
not neutral.247 To the contrary, the government is facilitating the demeaning of the
targeted group within the political community. The ability of that group and its members to speak and otherwise participate within the community will necessarily be
diminished. 248 In other words, a pluralist democratic government cannot merely provide an abstract framework of procedures that allows individuals to voice and assert
their respective interests and values, regardless of the content of those interests and
values. Certain questions--including substantive mattets---must be off the table if a
pluralist democracy is to exist. Most important, all individuals, regardless of subculture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing.
III. HISTORY REDUX: THE POLffiCS OF FREE SPEECH
When it comes to the politics of free expression, history once again provides a
sharp dose of reality. Free expression has never been neutral in American society. 249
It has never been equally enjoyed by all.250 To be sure, many Americans have reveled
in their own expressive liberties, but often those same Americans have purposefully
suppressed the speech and writings of other Americans, both officially (through
government processes) and unofficially (through nongovernment processes, such as
tar and feathering). 251 In many such instances, judicial pronouncements of constitutional doctrine have proven to be beside the point. 252 To a large degree, a practical
rule of free expression in America is that marginalized outsiders typically lose while
the wealthy and mainstream usually win. 253 If margiualized outsiders assert their
First Amendment rights to speak, courts hold it against them: sorry, no free speech
rights here.254 But when individuals who are wealthy or in the mainstream assert free
246

See SMITH, supra note 27, at 12 (arguing that egalitarians need "to give up conceiving
of good governments as bloodless neutral umpires ofprivate activities and preexisting rights'').
247

248

Id.

"[F]ree speech advocates who insist [on] ... open-minded free inquiry'' igoore the reality
that ''when many on campus are effectively silenced, inquiry is in fact neither free nor openminded." BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 43.
249
See discussion infra Section III.A.
250
See discussion i'!fra Section III.A.
251
See discussion infra Section III.A.
252
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 3-5.
253
See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 14 ("[T]he rigbtto free expression has been a tool of empowered people, not those who have been marginalized.''); Mark A. Graber, Constitutional
Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAw
& SOC. INQUIRY 309, 310 (2002) ("[llhe outliers in American politics were more ofteo than
not the victims than the beoeficiaries" of the Court's decisions).
254
See i'1fra notes 312-42 and accompanying text.
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speech rights, courts are likely to declare the importance ofFirst Amendment guaranteesandtofindtheexpressionconstitutionally~enifthespeechdenigrates

or attacks marginalized outsiders. 255 This phenomenon-that marginalized outsiders
typically lose while the wealthy and mainstream usually win-was true during the
republican democratic era and has continued to hold true during the pluralist democratic era, even though free expression is supposed to be a constitutionallodestar. 256
Examples are too numerous to cover comprehensively, but a few illustrations suffice
to make the point. 257
A. Winners and Losers
As early as the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that outsiders risked social
and legal punishments if they voiced their views. 258 An individual was free to speak or
write so long as he remained roughly within the broad mainstream of culture and
opinion, but penalties were severe for those who ventured outside those parameters. 259
"In America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion,"
Tocqueville wrote.260 "[W]ithin these barriers an author may write what he pleases,
but woe to him if he goes beyond them. Not that he is in danger of an auto-da-fe, but
he is exposed to continued obloquy and persecution.'"'' For example, religious minorities in many states lived with the threat that speaking contrary to mainstream Protestant
viewpoints might provoke a prosecution for blasphemy. 262 A Delaware court, upholding a blasphemy conviction in 183 7, explained that it had "been long perfectly
settled by the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious
and wanton attack against the christian religion individually, for the purpose of
exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and punishable ...." 263
An egregious instance of suppression involved the origins of the Church ofJesus
Christ ofl.atter-Day Saints.264 Joseph Smith, Jr., founded the Mormon movement in

"' See infra notes 302-32 and accompanying text.
256
See White, supra note 144, at 300-01.
257
For a more extensive discussion, see FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 70-152, 209-40,
420--62.
258
1 ALExiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA264 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835).
259
See id.
Id.
261 Id.
262
In accord with America's inegalitarian ascriptive tradition, non-Protestants have often
been targeted for suppression and persecution. See, e.g., SMTIH, supra note 27, at 75-76.
263
Statev. Chandler, 2Del (2Harr.) 553,555 (1837). According to a South Carolina court,
"[a]ll blasphemous publications, carrying upon their face that irreverent rejection ofGod and his
260

holy religion, which makes them dangerous to the community, have always been held to be
libels, and punishable at common law." City Council v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 524
(1848) (convicting Jewish defendant for violating Sunday law). See LEONARD W. LEvY, BLASPHEMY 400-23 (1993) (discussing state blasphemy cases from pre-Civil War America).
264
See irifi"a notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
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upstate New York during the frrst part of the nineteenth century.'65 He wrote the
Book ofMormon in 1830.266 In it, Smith incorporated the history ofEuropean colonization of America into Christian eschatology; Mormonism, that is, was to supplant
mainstream Christianity, just as early Christianity had been intended to supplant
Judaism (according to the New Testament). 267 Given such religious views, many
Americans feared that Mormonism threatened the predominant forms ofProtestantism as well as republican democracy.268 Persecution of the Mormons was common
and often violent, forcing Smith's followers to move from state to state as they sought
refuge. 269 From New York, Smith went to Ohio, where he was eventually dragged from
his house to be tarred and feathered. 270 Smith moved on to Jackson County, Missouri,
where mob violence again forced him to flee, this time to northern Missouri. 271
Further violence led the Mormons next to Illinois, where Smith was arrested, then
in June 1844, murdered while he was awaiting tria1. 272 Smith's successor, Brigham
Young, finally led the community to the Great Salt Lake area where they established
the autonomous State of Deseret,273 only to become embroiled with the federal
government in legal struggles that would stretch on for decades.274
265

SYDNEY E. AHLs1ROM,AREI.JGIOUSHISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 501--02 (1972).
!d. at 502.
267
!d. JON BUTI.ER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHiuSTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPlE
242 {1990); NA1HAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHiuSTIANITY
114-15 (1989).
268
See AHLS1ROM, supra note 265, at 557.
269
Id. at 505--06
270
!d. at 505.
271
!d. at 505--06.
272
Id. at 506.
273
!d. at 506--07; ERIC MICHAEL MAzuR, THE AMERICANIZATION OF REI.JGIOUS MINORITIES: CONFRONTING THE CONSTITIJTIONAL ORDER 69--89 (1999).
274
'Throughout the nineteenth centwy, many states explicitly limited the civil rights ofJews,
often long after the state-established churches had been eliminated. In the early nineteenth centwy, Jews could practice law in only four states: Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and
New York. FREDERIC CoP!E JAHER, A SCAPEGOAT IN THE NEW WilDERNESS: THE ORIGINS
AND RisE OF ANTI-SEMIT1SM IN AMERICA 121 {1994). In Maryland, Jews were proscribed
from holding public office until 1826, when the law was liberalized. CONSTITIJTION OF
MARYLAND {1776), reprinted in I THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITIJTIONS, COWNIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 817, 820 {Ben Perley Poore
ed., 2ded. 1878) [hereinafter I POORE]. Jewsthenconldholdoffice, butonlyiftheydeclared
a "belief in a future state of rewards and punishments."Final Form ofthe "Jew Bill" (1826),
reprinted in THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1840, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 53,
53 (Joseph L. Blau & SaloW. Barron eds., 1963). This bill was incorporated into the Maryland
Constitution of 1851. See CONSTITIJTION OF MARYLAND (1851 ), reprinted in I POORE, supra,
at 83 7, 839. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 limited public officeholding to those
individuals who accepted "the truth ofthe Protestautreligion." CONSTITIJTION OFNORTH CARGLINA{1776), reprinted in 2 THEFEDERALAND STATECONSTITIJTIONS, COWNIALCHARTERS,
AND0THER0RGANICLAWSOFTHEUNITED STATES 1409, 1413-14 [hereinafter 2 POORE].
This provision, as amended in 1835 tu allow all Christians to hold public office, remained in
266

2019]

BROKEN PLATFORMS, BROKEN COMMUNITIES?

977

During the nineteenth century, African Americans constituted the single societal
group that endured the most severe suppression, "given the preservation of slavery
as a legal institution.'ms Even free blacks lacked the civil rights of white citizens,
as the Supreme Court held inDred Scottv. Sandford, 216 decided in 1857.277 Slaves,
of course, were subjected to the most sweeping legal disabilities."' Unsurprisingly,
then, free expression was deemed a right inconsistent with the status of a slave. 279
Meanwhile, many abolitionists were suppressed, often violently, for voicing opposition to slavery, especially in the southern and border states.>••
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigrants were subject
to multiple forms of suppression. Anthony Comstock led a vigorous anti-obscenity
campaign that often targeted immigrant communities and inflamed mainstream fears
of the ostensibly un-American values of inunigrants!" During this era, factory
workers, many of whom were immigrants, also faced suppression if they attempted
to organize and form labor unions;282 courts consistently enjoined picketing and
other forms of expression that might facilitate unionizing!" Likewise, the World
War I Espionage Act prosecutions often targeted inunigrants, Socialists, and other
societal outsiders.284 The defendants in Debs v. United States and Schenck v. United
States were Socialists;"' the defendant in Frohwerk v. United States286 was the editor
of a German-language newspaper; 287 and all of the defendants in Abrams v. United
States were Russian-Jewish inunigrants!"
effect until 1868. See AMENDMENTS TO TilE CONS1TTUI10N OF 1776, reprinted in 2 POORE,
supra, at 1415, 1418 (allowing all Christians to hold office); CONS1TTUI10N OF NORTH
CAROLINA(1868), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra, at 1419, 1430 (this Constitution still barred
"all persons who shall deny the being of Almighty God"); MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TuRKS,
AND INFIDELS 42-50 (1984).
275
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 121.
276
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
277
!d. at 404-05.
278
See JACOB D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL 'fREATISEONTIIELAWOF SLAVERY 190-200
(1837) (discussing the legal incapacities of slaves); WATSON, supra note 35, at 22 (noting that
slaves had ''no rights of any kind'').
279
See Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560, 565 (1858).
28
For a discussion on abolitionist suppression, see RUSSEll.. B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM:
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND TilE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860 (1949); see also FElDMAN,
supra note 13, at 121-42. On the importance ofrace and whiteness in immigration laws, see
IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006).
281
FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 210-15.
282
!d. at 175-76.
283
Id. at 228-29.
284
!d. at 252.
285
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 49 (1919).
286
249 u.s. 204 (1919).
287
!d. at 205.
288
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
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Even after the transition to pluralist democracy and the enhancement of First
Amendment protections, societal outsiders frequently suffered both official and
unofficial forms of suppression. The Court upheld punishments of Communists,289
civil rights protesters,290 and Vietnam War protesters.291 A comparison oftwo hostile
audience cases from the post-World War ll era illustrates the typical judicial treatment of marginalized groups. In Terminiello v. Chicago, 292 a hostile audience case
decided in 1949, the Supreme Court concluded that the speaker-defendant's conviction under a disorderly conduct ordinance violated the First Amendment.293 The
constitutionally protected expression was an antisemitic diatribe.294 The defendant
had condemned "atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews."295 He claimed that
Jewish doctors had performed atrocities on Germans, and he asked, "Do you wonder
[that] they were persecuted in other countries ... ?"296 Then he proclaimed that "we
want them to go back where they came from."297 Yet, two years later, when the Court
decided another hostile audience case, Feiner v. New York, 298 the Court found the
speech unprotected.299 The speaker-defendant was a college student who had spoken
to a racially mixed crowd of seventy-five to eighty whites and blacks gathered together on a sidewalk in Syracuse, NewYork. 300 He had encouraged the audience to
attend a meeting of the Young Progressives of America, protested the city's cancellation of a permit for an earlier Young Progressives meeting, and made derogatory
remarks about "President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse,
and other local political officials."301 The Court held that the First Amendment did
not protect this speech because it created a clear and present danger' 02---tlven though
289

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding criminal convictions ofthe
leaders of the United States Communist Party for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of
the United States).
290
Adderleyv. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding the trespassing conviction ofstudents
for demonstrating on jailhouse grounds against the arrest of other students who had been protesting segregation). See Walkerv. Birmingham, 388U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding criminal contempt conviction ofMartin Luther King, Jr., without expressly reaching the free speech issue).
291
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the conviction ofan anti-war
protestor for burning his Selective Service registration certificate).
292
337 U.S. I (1949).
293
!d. at 6.
294
See id. at 20--21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
295
Id. at 20.
296 !d.
297
!d. at 21. The speaker was a Roman Catholic priest. !d. at 14. In the context ofthe United
States in the 1940s, one could possibly maintain that the Court protected the speech of a religious outsider.
298
340 u.s. 315 (1951).
299
Id. at 321.
300
!d. at316.
301
Jd.at317,324.
302
Id. at 320--21.
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the evidence suggested otherwise. 303 The Justices seemed especially worried that
Feiner had urged African Americans to "rise up in arms and fight for equal rights."304
Yet, witnesses had sworn that Feiner had instead encouraged his listeners to "rise
up and fight for their rights by going arm in arm to the [Young Progressives meeting], black and white alike. " 305
Hence, in Terminiello, the Court protected inflammatory antisemitic speech,
while in Feiner, the Court allowed the punishment of speech largely criticizing public
officials and encouraging African Americans to take political action.'06 To be sure,
the Justices might not have intentionally discriminated against marginalized outsiders in these cases. Regardless, in one case, Terminiello, the Court emphasized the
principled First Amendment protection of expression-speech that attacked a
marginalized group.' 07 In the other case, Feiner, the Court found speech that threatened the mainstream and elites to be unprotected.''' In sum, in cases involving inflammatory or vituperative expression, the communal statuses ofthe speaker and the
targeted group have at least tacitly influenced the Justices. A crucial landmark free
speech case of the twentieth century underscores this phenomenon. In Brandenburg
v. Ohio,"' decided in 1969, the Court famously articulated its most speech-protective standard ever for determining when subversive advocacy or, more generally,
speech inciting unlawful conduct, would be outside ofFirst Amendment protections
and therefore punishable.'" Yet, one should not overlook that the defendant had
spewed hate speech denouncing blacks and Jews. He had warned that "if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."311
While societal outsiders typically lose in free-expression disputes, the "haves"
usually come out ahead.' 12 Starting in the 1970s, the Court began to increase protection for wealth and the economic marketplace under the umbrella of the First
303
While there was "some pushing and shoving ... and some angry muttering'' in the crowd,
there were no fights or evidence of real "disorder." Id. at 330. (Douglas J., dissenting). One
isolated audience member threatened to "get [Feiner] offthere myself," id., but was not close
enough to Feiner to carry out the threat. Id. at 326 (Black, J., dissenting).
304
Id. at 317 (majority opinion).
305
Id. at 324, 324 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting).
306
Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 5, 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting), with
Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321, 324, 324 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting).
307
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
308
See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 317, 320-21.
309
395 u.s. 444 (1969).
310 See GEOFFREY R STONE, PERILOUS TiMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 522-23 (2004)
(discussing the implications of the Brandenburg decision).
311
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-47. The defendant was a Ku Klux Klan leader, so he
too was somewhat of an outsider during the time period of the late 1960s. Id. at 444.
312 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw. & Soc'YREv. 95 (1974) (discussing advantages ofthe wealthy and
powerful in litigation).
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Amendment. 313 One of the frrst cases to hold that commercial speech constituted
protected expression linked advertising to pluralist democracy and the self-governance rationale. In Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counci/, 314 the Court held unconstitutional a state law prohibiting licensed pharmacists from advertising prescription-drug prices. 315 Democracy concerns the allocation
of resources in society, the Court explained, but most resource-allocation decisions
are made through the economic marketplace. 316 "So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will
be made through numerous private economic decisions. " 317 The economic marketplace, from the Court's perspective, was a situs of democracy. Commercial speech
or advertising seemed essential for self-governance, for "the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system."318 Spending money had become a form of
democratic politics--of political expression, "[a]dvertising, however tasteless and
excessive it sometimes may seem, is ... dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. " 319 Consequently, government restrictions on advertising are "highly paternalistic" intrusions
into the marketplace (and, in turn, democratic processes). 320
The Roberts Court has pushed to new heights the First Amendment protection
of wealth and the marketplace, as demonstrated in a purported free speech case,
Sorrell v. IMS Health Incorporated. 321 Data mining, including the gathering, analysis,
and sale of data, is big business. 322 Sorrell arose from the gathering and use of medical
data. 323 Pharmacies routinely record information about prescriptions, such as the
doctor, the patient, and the dosage. 324 In Vermont, IMS Health Incorporated bought
this information, analyzed it, and sold reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers,
which used the reports to market their drugs more effectively to doctors. 325 Vermont
enacted a law to prevent pharmacies from selling this prescription information. 326
313
See Valentinev. Cbrestensen, 316U.S. 52,54-55 (1942)(holdingthatcommercialadvertising was a low-value category subject to government regulation). The Court first changed
directioninBige/owv. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,819-20 (1975)(holdingthatcommercialadvertising should no longer be deemed "unprotected per se'').
314
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
315
Id. at 770.
316
See id. at 765.
317
Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320
Id. at 770.
321
564 u.s. 552 (2011).
322
BRUCESCHNEIER,DATAANDGOIJA1H:lilEHIDDENBATILESTOC0ll.ECTYOURDATA
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 39-53 (2015) (discussing data mining).
323
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558.
324
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010).
325 Id.
326
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557-{;0.
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The legislature had two primacy purposes: first, to protect the privacy of patients and
doctors, and second, to improve public health by, for example, encouraging doctors
to prescribe drugs in their patients' best interests rather than because of effective
pharmaceutical marketing.'27 In such circumstances, the Court could have easily
concluded that the statute was a permissible exercise of the state's police power in
regulating the economic marketplace.'" As such, the statute would not even raise
a free speech issue. 329 But the Court instead reasoned that the statute raised an
unusual commercial speech issue.'" Commercial speech cases typically involve advertising, and as the Court admitted, the statute in Sorrell did not restrict advertising
per se. 331 Yet, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment not only applied but also
required "heightened judicial scrutiny," which the state could not satisfY. 332
The Roberts Court's most renowned First Amendment decision protecting wealth
and the economic marketplace is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,'"
which upheld (or created) a right for corporations to spend unlimited sums on political advertising.'34 After explaining that spending on political advertising constitutes speech,335 and that free speech protections extend to corporations,'36 the Court
emphasized that free expression must be a constitutional lodestar in American
democracy, "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy.... The right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. " 337
The Court also invoked the search-for-truth rationale.'" Restrictions on corporate
campaign expenditures, the Court reasoned, interfere "with the 'open marketplace'
of ideas protected by the First Amendment. " 339 But the Court appeared to confound
the marketplace of ideas and the economic marketplace, "[t]he censorship we now
confront is vast in its reach," the Court explained. 340 "The Government has 'muffle[d]
327

Id. at 572.
Id. at 580-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
329
Id. at 581.
330
Tire statute may appear like a ''mere commercial regulation." Id at 556. However, while
''the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce ... from imposing
incidental burdens on speech," the Court held that the statute was actually a commercial speech
law that "impose[d] a burden based on the content of speech and the identity ofthe speaker."
Id. at 567.
331
Id. at 562-{;3.
332
Id. at 557.
333
558 u.s. 310 (2010).
334
Id. at 365.
'" Id. at 336-39.
336
Id. at 340-42.
337
Id. at 339.
338
See id. at 354.
339
CitizensUnitedv. FEC, 558U.S. 310,354 (2010)(quotingN.Y. StateBd. ofElections
v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
340 Id.
328
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the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy. "'341
Speech, from this perspective, does not emanate from people--that is, from citizensbut from "segments of the economy."342
B. Beyond Constitutional Principle

What does this history, ranging from the early nineteenth century through the
Roberts Court, have to do with the campus no-platfonning disputes? The history
suggests that, in these campus disputes, we need to look beyond the constitutional
principle and doctrines of free expression. 343 In particular, who invites the controversial speakers, and who pays for them?
Universities and colleges, in fact, rarely invite speakers to campus; in most
instances, a department or student organization extends an invitation.344 Significantly,
then, conservative student organizations often purposefully manufacture these disputes by inviting controversial speakers who push the boundaries of propriety and
are likely to provoke outrage. 345 With regard to the Federalist Society, the student
organization that invited Sommers to Lewis and Clark Law School, the national organization maintains a Speakers Bureau, a list of approved speakers. 346 The student
chapters decide whom to invite. 347 Most importantly, the Federalist Society supplies
funding; it sponsors lectures and other events, paying travel costs and honoraria 348
341

Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540U.S. 93,257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
Id.
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1924-28 (arguing for free speech realism
and a rejection offonnalism); Richard Delgado, Taward a Legal Realist View ofthe First
Amendment, 113 HAR.v. L. REv. 778 (2000) (arguing the same).
344
BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at 25.
345
Id. at 7, 23; Joseph Russomanno, Speech on Campus: Haw America's Crisis in Confidence Is Eroding Free Speech Values, 45HAsTINGSCONST.L.Q.273, 275 (2018) (discussing
342
343

claims that conservative organizations choreograph free speech campus disputes).
346
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, SOURCEWATCH, https:/lwww
.sourcewatch.org/index.phP/Federalist_Society_for_Law_and_Public_Policy_Studies [http://
perma.cc/2PAE-XGXE] [hereinafter Federalist Society].
347
Eugene B. Meyer, Letter From The President, in FEDERAliST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
PuBuc POUCY STUDIES: 2010 ANNuAL REPoRT 1, 1 (2010), https://fedsoc-cms-public.s3
.amazonaws.com/update/pdf!kFrpiRa7RXgKX5yDUW:z;jKQFQy7eOrA9dmAQJWDkY.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YDD9-FQRK].
348
"The Society's main purpose is to sponsor fair, serious, and open debate about the need
to enhance individual freedom and the role of the courts in saying what the law is rather than
what they wish it to be." Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERAliST SOC'Y, https://fedsoc.org
/frequently-asked-<juestions [http://penna.cc/5MJ7-QQ5K]. Ron Coleman, "a former Federalist
Society chapter president," refers to the provision for speakers of''public platforms, honoraria
and travel stipends." Ron Coleman, Comment To The Federalist Society Caves to "Rape Culture" Orthodoxy, MINDING 1ilE CAMPUS (Oct 19, 2014), https://www.mindingthecampus.org
/201411 0/19/the-federalist-society-caves-to-rape-culture-orthodoxy/ [http://perma.cc/6SFC
-J62Z]. For an example of a Federalist Society Stodent Division Speaker Reimbursement
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And the organization is rolling in money; as of2014, it had received more than $52
million in donations.' 49 Funding comes from renowned conservative foundations
such as the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, as well as from other sources.''"
The organization enjoys such an abundance of resources that it can sponsor several
hundred events each year while also covering travel costs for junior scholars seeking
to present papers at workshops and conferences.'" This type of alignment of conservative student groups, well-funded national conservative organizations, and conservative
campus speakers is fairly typical. 352 TheYoung America's Foundation facilitates the
invitation of conservative speakers by student groups and then substantially covers
the costs.'" When Ann Coulter was invited to University of California, Berkeley,
the Foundation covered most of her $20,000 speaking fee.' 54
This alignment of wealth and power behind a right-wing speaker like Sommers
casts a shadow over the Lewis and Clark no-platforming dispute. Recall that critics
of the protesters maintained that the appropriate response for those who disagreed
with Sommers was counter-speech: They should have responded in kind by expressing their own alternative views. 355 According to the critics, that is, protesters should
have operated within the marketplace of ideas in a societal search for truth. 356 The
problem with this approach, also advocated by numerous constitutional scholars,'"
is that it blinks reality. It pretends that we live and express ourselves in something
akin to a Habermasian ideal speech situation.'" According to Jiirgen Habermas, an
ideal speech situation is a counterfactual intersubjective encounter that is cleansed
of domination, coercion, and other distortions, such as economic power.'" As such,
Request Form, covering travel expenses and honoraria, see https://s3 .amazonaws.com/fedsoc
-cms-public/lilmuy/doclib/2011 0724_SpeakersForm.pdf [http://perma.cc/XHC9-RUL6].
349
Federalist Society, supra note 346.
350
Id. See TELES, supra note 152, at 147-51 (discussing the funding of the Federalist
Society).
'" Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERAilST SOC'Y, supra note 348 (discussing number
ofevents); Support Funds for Presentation ofJunior Scholarship, FEDERAllSTSOC'Y, https:/I
fedsoc.orlifopportunities/support-funds-fur-presentation-<Jf-junior-scholarship [http://permacc
/7EUT-JQJH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
352
See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf; Trickle-Dawn Antagonism, lNSIDEifiGHERED(May 10, 2017),
https:/lwww.insidehigheredcomlnews/2017/05/10/gop-student-groups-mirror-tactics-national
-organizations [http://permacc/89RE-MGSF] (discussing the phenomenon ofconservative national groups coordinating with student chapters to bring conservative speakers to campuses).
353
YOUNGAMER!CA'SFOUNDATION,https://www.yaf.org [https://permacc/WSP4-8UXW].
'"' Stephanie Saul, The Conservative Force Behind Speeches Roiling College Campuses,
N.Y. TiMES (May 20, 2017), https://nyti.rns/2rCnOw7.
'" See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
356
See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
357
BEN-PORA1H, supra note 5, at39; CIIEMERINSKY &GilLMAN, supra note 5, at 19-20;
PALFREY, supra note 5, at 17; WlllTI1NGTON, supra note 5, at 28-50.
'" See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
359
JDR.GEN HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND 1HE
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an ideal speech situation "makes possible unforced universal agreement."'" Truth,
then, is an intersubjective phenomenon arising from a consensus among a group of
speakers in such an ideal situation; the only force that matters is the rational force
of the best argument. 361 In short, Habermas' s ideal speech situation is what we wish
the marketplace of ideas to be. 362
But the marketplace ofideas is not an ideal speech situation. In reality, the marketplace of ideas is never free of distortions."' It is constantly skewed by prejudices,
coercion, and especially economic power, as illustrated in many ofthe no-platfurming
disputes, including the Lewis and Clark imbroglio. 364 When one group of students,
such as a student chapter of the Federalist Society, can access extensive funding to
invite controversial speakers, such as Sommers, any ostensible societal search for
truth is torpedoed before it even leaves the dock. As soon as the speaker arrives on
campus, the starting point for discussion is tilted. The protesters in such scenarios
might appear to interfere with the marketplace of ideas, but such a conclusion disregards what preceded the protests. The provision of funding and the invitation already
undermined the search for truth. 365 The fact that conservative student organizations
sometimes purposefully provoke no-platforming disputes only underscores the
failure of the marketplace of ideas. 366
EVOLUTION OF SOCIE1Y 1-3 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979). In his later work, Habennas
spoke of an "ideal communication community." JVRGEN IlABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO ADISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322 (William
Rehg trans., 1996).
360
JVRGEN HABERMAS, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 181, 206 (1980).
361 !d.
362

For more extensive discussions ofHabennas's communication theory, see THOMAS

MCCAR1HY, IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS: ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARYCRmCAL THEORY (1991 ); Stephen M Feldman, The Problem q{Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer WithinMetamodemism, 4 CONTEMP. PoL. THEORY
296 (2005) (discussing Habennas in conjWiction with Gadamer and Derrida).
363
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSnTUTIONAL LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988); Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace ofIdeas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. I.
364
See PALFREY, supra note 5, at 67 (recognizing that, in the marketplace of ideas, some
people have more power than others).
365
"What =erges in the market might better be viewed as a testimonial to power than as
a reflection of truth." STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INWSTICE, AND TilE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA 6 (1999).
366
Gross disparities of wealth and an over-emphasis on the economic marketplace can
threaten democracy and democratic rights. See THOMAS l'IKET1Y, CAPITAL IN TilE TwEN1YFlRsTCENTuRY(ArthurGoldhammertrans.,2014);seealsoFEIDMAN,FAII1NGCONSnTUTION,
S!pl"a note 29, at 159-250 (arguing that gross inequality, among other factors, threatens American democratic government); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S TilE RrGFIT THING TO DO
266 (2009) (arguing that gross inequality of wealth 'imdennines the solidarity that democratic
citizenship requires"); Kate Klonick, The Nr<W Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARv. L.REv. 1598 (2018)(argningthat individual equality
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The inherent distortions, the operations of economic and other forms of power,
in these campus disputes remind us that a university (or the government) cannot
maintain neutrality. When the search for truth is distorted before the conversation
gets off the ground, then neutrality is impossible. The accumulation and protection
of wealth, a central distorting factor in the marketplace of ideas, cannot occur without
government sanction. By facilitating the operation ofthe economic marketplace and
the ensuing disparities of wealth, the government has already placed its thumb on
one side of the scales in any dialogic search for truth. 367 In the no-platforming
disputes, the university (or college) that grants a platform contravenes neutrality at
the outset. To be sure, denial of a platform would also contravene neutrality. But
that fact only underscores a key point, neutrality is, quite simply, not an option.
Progressives and conservatives alike might not want university administrators
to decide who is invited to speak on campus. Such administrative decision making,
it is argued, resonates too closely with censorship.368 Indeed, many university administrators undoubtedly would prefer not to make such decisions.'69 Ultimately, though,
some individual or institotion decides. And right now, conservative stodent groups
and conservative national organizations with deep pockets often decide, in effect,
whether to grant platforms for potential campus speakers. This crucial point circles
back around to the substantive component ofpluralist democracy: the need to guarantee
full and equal participation for all. 370 When some individuals and groups--especially
historically marginalized groups--are excluded from participating in decision-making,
then the outcome of the decision process is likely to manifest and reinforce exclusion and marginalization-whether in Congress or on a university campus.' 71
In fact, conservative organizations currently seek to restrict and shape expression
on campuses in multiple ways.'72 Numerous conservative Christian colleges, including
Jerry Falwell's Liberty University, have denied platforms to speakers deemed unacceptable, including other Christians who question the politics of pro-Trump
and freedom now depend on corporation decisions); K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the
AdministrativeStateinAnEraofEconomicandDemocraticCrisis, 131 HARv.L.REv.1671
(2018) (reviewing JOND. MICHAELS, CONS1ITUTIONALCOUP: PRIVATIZATION'S 'THREAT TO
1IIEAMERICANREPUBUC(2017)) (arguing that privatization threatens democratic controls).
367
Dahl argued that property and wealth endanger democracy if the wealthy can convert
economic power into political power. DAHL, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at
68--69. Likewise, Sandel argued that economic inequality Widermines political community.
SANDEL, supra note 15, at 330-32.
368
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 19--20, 72-73.
369
See id. at 149 (the authors, both campus administrators, worry about the "risk [of]
creating a campus orthodoxy of opinion'').
37
° FElDMAN, supra note 13, at 396.
371
If university administrators do not want to decide about campus platforms, then they
should at least allow students to vote for potential speakers in fully fair elections--before the
speakers are invited.
372
See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
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evangelicals. 373 Meanwhile, organizations such as the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) and the Goldwater Institute have proposed model legislation that
would regulate campus speech while claiming to upholdFirstAmendment freedoms. 374
These organizations are not politically neutral. For example, ALEC is renowned for
drafting model legislation that generally limits government, promotes an unregulated
economic marketplace, and otherwise advances conservative causes. 375 ALEC encourages lawmakers to enact its various model Acts at the state level. 376 Its membership
consists ofnearly 2,000 state legislators, almost all of whom are Republicans, as well
as corporations and corporate officers. 377 Most ofALEC's funding comes from corporations, including Pfizer, BankofAmerica,BestBuy, Walmart, AT&T, and Verizon. 378
Corporate members can effectively veto any proposed model legislation. 379
The Goldwater Institute claims to be a libertarian organization. 380 Its so-called
Campus Free Speech Act is instructive. 381 It expressly prohibits the types of "protests and demonstrations" that have disrupted no-platformed controversial conservative speakers like Sommers. 382 It also mandates that a university "shall strive to remain neutral, as an institution, on the public policy controversies ofthe day," yet the
Act does not clarify what university actions might be construed to be non-neutral. 383
Ifthe University president speaks against funding cuts for the University, is that prohibited speech on a policy controversy? And when might faculty speech be deemed
"' Laurie Goodstein, 'This Is Not ofGod': When Anti-Trump Evangelicals Confront Their
Brethren, N.Y. TIMEs (May 23, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GI8eXI; The Invisible Free Speech
Crisis, NEWREPuBliC (Apr. I 0, 20 18), https://newrepublic.com/article/147908/invisible-free
-speech-crisis [http://perrna.cc/4AHM-WBB9].
374
Stanley Kurtz eta!., Campus Free Speech: A Legislative Proposal, GOIDWATERINST.
(Jan. 30, 20 17), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cms_page_media/201 7/2
/2/X_ Campus%20Free%20Speech%20Paper.pdf [http://perrna.cc/5D3R-T9EA]; Forming
Open and Robust University Minds (Forum) Act, AM. LEGIS. Exrn. COUNCIL (June 23,
2017), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/fonning-open-and-robust-university-minds-forum
-act [http://perma.ccND7N-2TDE].
375
Mike Mcintire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts As A Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y.
TIMEs (Apr. 21, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2jEpXXx.
376
Molly Jackman, ALEC's Influence Over LawmakingIn State Legislatures, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-in-state
-legislatures [https://perma.cc/6T4W-FL97].
377
378

Id.
Id.

379

Information on ALEC is drawn from the following sources: Mcintire, supra note 375;
John Nichols, ALEC Exposed, THE NATION (July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/article
/alec-exposed [http://perma.cc/DVE5-TZYN] (last visited Apr. II, 20 19); ALEC EXPOSED,
https:/lwww.alecexposed.org/wiki/ALEC_Exposed [http://perrna.cc/K4ZG-WVNZ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
380
GOIDWATERINST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org/about [http://perma.cc/QAS4-DRPG]
(last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
381
Kurtz eta!., supra note 374, at 19-22.
382
Id. at 20.
383

Id.
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institutional? If I send an email concerning a political controversy-for instance, let's
say I interpret the Second Amendment as allowing gun regulation-would my email
signature, which includes my faculty title, transform my writing into prohibited institutionalspeech?TheActevenmandatesanominousBig-Brother-like"Committee
on Free Expression," which shall report, criticize, and recommend university actions
to comply with the legislative requirements. 384 Significantly, several Republicancontrolled states have discussed and enacted legislation based on this model Act. 385
CONCLUSION

The growing pluralism of American society in the early twentieth century led
eventually to the emergence of pluralist democracy and the transformation of free
expression into a constitutional lodestar. Ironically, then, in the no-platforming disputes, the critics of the protesters base their arguments on the lodestar status of free
expression while resisting the democratic implications of a pluralist community. 386
While the challenges of a pluralist society engendered the strengthening of First
Amendment freedoms in the twentieth century, those same challenges necessitate
limits on free expression when necessary to preserve democracy. Expression cannot
be free when it undermines the democratic status of marginalized groups in our
polity. Certain issues must be offthe table, beyond democratic debate, because debate
of such issues would contravene the conditions necessary for robust pluralist democracy. All individuals, including members of historically marginalized groups,
must be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing.
Nevertheless, this Article should not be interpreted as an argument against free
expression. First Amendment freedoms are central to our pluralist democracy. But
free expression has never been an absolute. As the Court has recognized over the
years, the government can justifiably punish or otherwise restrict expression in numerous circumstances. 387 Regardless of whether the Court can be persuaded to deem
speech uttered by right-wing provocateurs as categorically low-value expression
outside First Amendment protection, the Court has allowed the government to restrict
offensive expression in a variety of situations. 388 At a minimum, the no-platforming
disputes demand similar judicial treatment. 389
384
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387
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To be clear, hecklers are not necessarily entitled to shout down a speaker in a
hostile audience situation. Frequently, in such situations, police should protect the
speaker and control the crowd.'" But in the no-platforming disputes, a hostile audience situation can be easily avoided. Universities and colleges should restrict the
granting of platforms to speakers likely to threaten the full and equal standing of
marginalized groups on the campuses. If a platform is denied in the first place, then
a hostile audience situation will not arise. A student organization with deep pockets
should not be free tu invite speakers likely to challenge the full and equal status of
some members of the campus community.'"
A university or college, in such a situation, would not deny a platform to a
conservative speaker because she is conservative per se. Conservative speakers must
be allowed to speak and challenge progressive positions. But no speakers, conservative
or progressive, can be allowed to undermine the substantive conditions necessary
for democracy. No speakers can be allowed to undermine the democratic status of
members of the political community.
This Article, fmally, does not advocate for thought control. 392 While many individuals (including myself) would prefer that dislike and hatred of outsiders disappear,
such attitudes are likely to persist far into the future. But for exactly that reasonbecause America has long sustained an inegalitarian, ascriptive tradition targeting
societal outsiders--campuses should act to prevent the public expression ofhatreds
that undermine the existence of a truly democratic community. 393 The United States
might harbor an inner Mr. Hyde, but we do not need to sit back and watch while
letting him control the nation.
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